

The Securitization of Water Discourse - Abstracts

Participants listed in order of presentations:

Max Boykoff, University of Colorado	<p>‘Fight Semantic Drift’: Interrogating public discourse(s) and the spectrum of environmental policy action(s)</p> <p>To ‘fight semantic drift’ is to negotiate meaning. Meaning is constructed and maintained as well as contested through dynamic and power-laden processes in the public arena. This ‘fight’ for discursive security therefore involves not only themes that gain traction in discourses, but also those that are absent from them or silenced (Derrida 1978; Dalby, 2007). These interactions have important effects in terms of marginalizing some discourses while contributing to the entrenchment and institutionalization of others (Castree, 2004). Moreover, discursive and material elements tether to ‘truths’, realities, perspectives and social practices (Hall 1997). Examples from politics, economics, culture, the environment and society surround us. Among them, I will concentrate on media portrayals of climate, water and security discourses, as well as interactions therein.</p> <p>Mass media serve vital roles in communication processes between science, policy and the public, and often stitch together environmentally-related perceptions, intentions, considerations, and actions. Many complex factors contribute to how media outlets portray various facets of these issues. I will argue that media representations are critical inputs to what becomes public discourse regarding what are today’s environmental challenges, such as water availability and secure access/use. As such, this presentation will examine how media coverage then shapes a “scope of politics” (Rosati 2007, 1008), paying particular attention to how discursive constructions – and their institutionalization – contribute to critical misperceptions, misleading debates, distractions and divergent understandings. These have the potential to be detrimental and/or constructive for efforts that seek to enlarge rather than constrict the spectrum of possibility for responses to environmental challenges. Overall, I situate these issues in the wider context of a ‘cultural politics’, where formal environmental science and governance link with people’s everyday activities in the public sphere.</p>
Aaron Wolf, Oregon State University	<p>International Water Resources and US National Security</p> <p>In the long, tenuous historical relationship between high and low politics, water resources and national security have played a central role. In the post-WWII United States, water has been raised regularly as a high security issue. Examples abound, from the US Bureau of Reclamation’s role in the development of the Mekong River Committee in the 1950’s, to sponsorship in the Middle East of the Johnston negotiations and nuclear-powered “agro-industrial complexes” in the 1950’s and 1960’s, to the “water wars” discourse of the mid-1980’s, to the 2012 Intelligence Community Assessment of “global water security.”</p> <p>This presentation will explore each of these instances where water took on high political import, and investigate the roles, contexts, motives of those involved, as well as the securitizing language used. The overarching relationship between high and low political issues will be emphasized.</p>
François Molle, IRD/IWMI	<p>Large-scale water control and the discourse of inevitability</p> <p>Large-scale water schemes, whether they involve large irrigation schemes, big dams or massive trans-basin water transfers have come together with a complex mix of socially situated blessings and curses. As public investments they are often justified by a rhetoric that may include, but invariably goes beyond, the sole perspective of return to capital. While some arguments clearly</p>

	<p>contribute to state-building and the constitution of symbolic and political capital, others can come under the label of <i>securitization</i>, as they mobilize <i>meta-justifications</i> that are used to provide a sense of inevitability governed by the common good and, in effect, tend to close the debate. The presentation reviews a number of iconic large-scale water control projects and analyze the discourses, arguments and –sometimes- controversies in which they are shrouded, emphasizing the <i>securitization</i> dimensions of concepts/justifications such as poverty alleviation, water security, food security, or ‘development’. More widely we also explore the conventional policy discourses, arguments or indicators that are invoked to prepare the ground for <i>inevitable</i> large-scale investments.</p>
Farhad Mukhtarov, Delft University of Technology	<p>Ways of knowing’ water: Integrated Water Resources Management and Water Security as complementary discourses</p> <p>Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been a hegemonic discourse in water governance for the last two decades. Supported by global organizational structures, material incentives and ideational propagation, IWRM has become an established frame of reference for discussing water. However, since the late 2000s, IWRM has been challenged by the competing discourse of <i>water security</i>. With growing realization that considerations of values, ethics and power are under-represented, IWRM has recently come under criticism. Water security, in turn, with explicit reference to human values and greater emphasis on politics, has emerged as an attractive alternative. This article applies <i>the</i> “ways of knowing” approach to study the relationship between these two discourses. ‘Ways of knowing’ acknowledge multiple types of knowledge in a policy debate such as <i>normative</i>, <i>discursive</i> and <i>practical</i>. IWRM discourse has been narrowly construed as a normative ‘way of knowing’ water based on solely technical-scientific knowledge. In turn, water security represents an emphasis on the ‘discursive’ way of knowing water with greater consideration of values, ethics and power. These two ways of knowing are complementary to each other rather than conflicting and must be considered as such. In addition, studies of practice of IWRM and water security are important to add the ‘practical’ way of knowing water to the debate, which will then have a greater potential to result in a legitimate and lasting consensus on what represents good water governance in a specific context.</p>
Nicole Detraz, University of Memphis	<p>Drowning in Insecurity: Gender, and the Securitization of Water</p> <p>The securitization of water is an ever popular process in global debates and policymaking. This paper asks the question where is gender in discourses of water security? Gender lenses make important contributions to environmental security scholarship in general, and the water sector is no exception. The paper examines the case of water issues (particularly flooding and agriculture) in South Asia. It investigates the nature of flooding for basins in the region and the suggested causes and solutions to worsening flood events. The chapter also examines the shifts in agriculture that have taken place over the past few decades that have been motivated by water shortages and food security issues. The chapter illustrates that although this region receives a significant amount of attention from scholars who use security and environment discourses, they rarely consider how the issues that they focus on are gendered. The chapter also addresses the ways in which gender is seen in current hydropolitics policies and where gender is absent from these policy processes. It concludes that the incorporation of gender is an important component of understanding the threats and vulnerabilities that accompany water insecurity.</p>
Christina Cook, University of British Columbia	<p>Water Security: Debating an Emerging Paradigm</p> <p>This paper presents a comprehensive review of the concept of water security, including both academic and policy literatures. The analysis indicates that the use of the term water security has increased significantly in the past decade,</p>

	<p>across multiple disciplines. The paper presents a comparison of definitions of, and analytical approaches to, water security across the natural and social sciences, which indicates that distinct, and at times incommensurable, methods and scales of analysis are being used. We consider the advantages and disadvantages of narrow versus broad and integrative framings of water security, and explore their utility with reference to integrated water resources management. In conclusion, we argue that an integrative approach to water security brings issues of good governance to the fore, and thus holds promise as a new approach to water management.</p>
Undala Alam, Queen's University, Belfast	<p>Blinded by intuition: The myth of water wars</p> <p>The myth of water wars continues to cripple understanding of how to manage water amongst politicians and the media. The belief that increasing demand for water will tip competitive use into war makes intuitive sense not least if there is already a wider conflict. Amongst the more dramatic incarnations was the Independent's headline on 28 February 2006, "Water Wars". The British newspaper relied on the usual narratives to predict a descent into war. Buried in the apocalyptic vision were several problems, not least of which was a lack of evidence to support the war narrative. By ignoring extensive research demonstrating international cooperation to be the norm, the water war narrative has gained considerable currency in policy circles. In this article, I interrogate the myth's persistence, and the corresponding implications for future water availability given the spectre of climate change. I use critical geopolitics to problematise and unpack the myth, tracking its evolution from meaning war between sovereign nation-states to the current situation that equates any conflict over any scale as a 'water war'. I argue the sustained focus on water wars ignores the socially constructed nature of water scarcity, since access to water is negotiated in a given space-time continuum by complex economic, ecological and socio-political interactions. The war narrative simplifies these interactions to create uniform absolutes that are sustained by its intuitive nature.</p>
Klervi Fustec, University of Montpellier	<p>'Water' and 'security' for the Palestinian Authority: when state building means controlling water</p> <p>Palestinian water issues are embodied into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Water is one of the five issues at stake for the final agreement. Much has been written from the International relations theories point of view, this study questions the ideas of 'water' and 'security' from the perspective of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under the political ecology framework. The PA attributes water scarcity to politics (Israeli occupation), and natural ones (climate change will exacerbate the scarcity). The PA argues the process of water securization by the following two discourses. Firstly, the claim for human security defined by the UNDP which means that their discourses are focusing on individual security regarding the right to water. Secondly, the negotiations with Israel concerning the allocation of resources. PA discourses concerning water are not about emphasizing the conflict but are about cooperation and agreement finding. Discourses are politically and socially constructed so are the discourses of the PA about water and security. According to them the solution for water is in part achieved from the revision of Oslo agreement, and in-part from the process of Palestinian state building. Water is shown as one of the pillars for the future state. The PA aims to have sovereign control over all water resources of the West Bank and Gaza strip and to govern these resources following principles of Integrated Water Resources Management. According to the PA, the security of the state would be the solution for the security of individual and would lead to a de-securization of water discourses.</p>
Pauline Brücker, Sciences Po / IDDRI	<p>Legitimizing water securitisation: the case of Human Right and Human Security</p>

<p>Krystel Wanneau - ULB / Chaire Bernheim</p>	<p>There has been in the recent years an increasing interest over the securitisation of shared water, both in conflict/non-conflict context. The case of the Oslo Agreement is nothing but an acute illustration of the pros and cons of securitisation/de-securitisation processes. Since its establishment, structural water shortages have worsened in the West Bank. Discourses failed to bring a durable solution to the recurrent drought crises despite a cooperation framework, and thus put into question the securitisation process. This paper explores risks and opportunities of securitisation process based on discourse analysis. Understood in a broad sense, discourses are not 'regimes of truth' but rather 'artificial analytical constructs' of an issue. Water discourses inform us on how policy's response may lead to critical situation with regards to water security. They provide an interpretation of why securitisation fails or succeeds. The question we raise is if human right and human security legitimize securitisation? Is the Oslo cooperation building safeguards and protection mechanisms? There is a rooted belief that cooperation among other governing patterns fosters peace and reduces the divide. This assertion was recently criticized for the 'silent' or 'structural' violence it may also install. Unlike any other discourse, human right and human security based discourses puts any violence on trial. They remain under-studied in spite of the legitimacy they would add to the securitisation process. The paper will argue that the securitisation of shared water resources may not prevent water crisis and propose ways to improve the legitimization with regards to international legal standards.</p>
<p>Lucia De Stefano, Universidad Complutense de Madrid</p>	<p>Using drought as a 'hook' for action: analysing the water discourse in Spain</p> <p>Several scholars argue that the securitization of the water discourse can be due to interest in drawing public attention on specific water issues and getting larger funding to deal with them. The use of language that emphasizes concepts like 'disaster', 'urgency' and 'emergency' can have an effect similar to the water securitization one, as in an emergency context ordinary decision-making procedures can often be bypassed and open debate minimized. The paper considers a special case of water-related emergency – droughts in Spain – and applies a <i>Frame Analysis</i> approach to analyse how drought is defined and problematized in formal and informal documents, and how that links with the associated actions or calls for action. The paper will argue that the idea of threat to water security posed by droughts is used as a 'hook' to achieve objectives that actually have little to do with drought prevention or mitigation. The interest of the study for the workshop is twofold. On one side the paper proposes and tests a methodology that could easily be applied to other contexts to shed light into how the water discourse is securitized through language in formal and informal documents; on the other side, the study provides an example of a 'creeping' securitization of the water discourse, meant as the 'dramatization' of the discourse of governmental and nongovernmental actors, who magnify interregional tensions and predict impending disasters to achieve their political or lobbying goals.</p>
<p>Daanish Mustafa, King's College, London</p>	<p>Unpacking the scalar discourse of water securitization and nation building: the case of the Indus Basin</p> <p>Water has increasingly been commodified under contemporary dominant neo-liberal regime. The more recent commodification as it intersects with the older theme of nation building and discursive construction of hydrological features as knowable, controllable, schematic networks points towards the dominance of the nation state scale securitization of water. While the western ecological concerns offers a counter point to the recent technocratic/militarist/nationalist construction of water as a securitized resource—it is unlikely to have much efficacy in terms of effectively undermining the now, almost hegemonic discourse. It is argued that a less visible discourse that rescales the debate to</p>

	<p>the local and engages with issues of equity, efficiency and livelihoods for the poorest is much more likely to have traction as a counter discourse in the global South. Through a case study of the Indus Basin in India and Pakistan the dominant nation-state scale securitized discourse on water will be critiqued. It will be pointed out that water conflict is most potent and has its strongest potential for undermining peace and stability through its local scale inequitable and unsustainable geographies. While both India and Pakistan both seem to be eagerly moving towards securitizing their water resources and opening up yet another discursive front in their geopolitical conflict—there is an urgent need to diversify the voices contributing to the policy and popular debates on water in the region.</p>
Anders Jägerskog, Stockholm International Water Institute	<p>Climate change and transboundary waters in the Jordan Basin: a force for securitization?</p> <p>‘Climate Change’ is breaking into the political realm where it matters in small and large decisions, <i>adding to the existing global water crisis</i> presenting further critical elements to a <i>problematique</i> already suffering from complexity, securitisation and politicisation. In the case of the Jordan Basin – characterised by complex politics and either unilateral or (at best) bilateral cooperation – the climate change (or perceived results of it) is adding yet another dimension. The parties in a basin are approaching the dynamic in different ways. These can be characterised as either <i>adapt</i>, <i>resist</i> or <i>subvert</i>. <i>Adapt</i>: by adopting GCC-oriented concepts, promote legal instruments, establishing institutional frameworks and implement action plans at the regional/basin, national and even local level; <i>Resist</i>: by refusing or contesting the fundamentals of GCC debate, and deliberately disregard it in the policies and discourses adopted in the management of transboundary water resources; <i>Subvert</i>: by subverting the use of the GCC concepts, legal and institutional frameworks for other purposes rather than to adapt/mitigate the so-called Climate Change impacts. In the case of the Jordan Basin one can note differences in the discourses. In Israel it is largely securitized and efforts at subversion can be detected; in Palestine the efforts to adapt are emerging as well is the case in Jordan. In combination, the above constitutes a rather discomfoting situation and a governance challenge: we have an underlying pressure for change, and an institutional set-up (bilateral at best, cf Israel-PA, Israel-Jordan, Jordan-Syria) largely hostile to change. The presentation and paper will further delve into the aspects of how the climate change discourse is being picked up by states in the Jordan basin using the above described characterisations. The outcome of that exercise will in turn be viewed from the securitization perspective.</p>
Dimitrios Zikos, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin	<p>Is there enough space for water in a highly polarized discourse on...security? The case of Cyprus</p> <p>The troubled island of Cyprus has remained divided now for nearly 40 years. Despite the rapid progress made at political level and the new hopes for reconciliation and reunification, a new threat has arisen: water scarcity. The deterioration of water resources in both quantitative and qualitative terms constitutes a situation that equally threatens the security of both Cypriot communities. Climatic changes are expected to increase the problem even further. The implications of such a phenomenon may soon monopolize the environmental discourses but could also contaminate the political arena, as competition over this valuable resource may lead to inter- (or intra-) communal conflicts, putting the common future of the island at stake. The individual efforts of each community to solve the problem, has not contributed at all to the political discourses. On the contrary, given the reliance on pharaonic water works that increase dependencies either at the political level (for instance the water pipe to Turkey) or at the resource level (for example desalination plants and increased energy demand), additional constraints may hinder further any political developments. However, water scarcity also constitutes an opportunity</p>

	<p>to abolish not only the natural but also – most importantly – the mind-made borders between the two Cypriot communities and thus to contribute towards a mutually secure and prosperous future. This paper builds upon research findings from three projects conducted in Cyprus from 2009 to 2012. Namely the EU funded project “GoverNat: Multi-level Governance of Natural Resources: Tools and Processes for Water and Biodiversity Governance in Europe”, the project “The Cypriot Natural Resources as a Common Space” financed by the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Cyprus Centre and the project “Sharing Water and Environmental Values: Peace Construction efforts in Cyprus”, funded by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP) and the Agency for Management of University and Research Grants of Catalonia (AGAUR). Based on the preliminary findings of the above mentioned projects, the authors explore the potential of a multitude of methods, developed within different disciplines -and often for a different scope than the one for which they were applied in this paper- in shifting the political discourses dominated by security issues, taking water scarcity as an entry point. More specifically, the authors employ a whole range of novel tools, methods and methodologies (needs-based approach, common pool resource experiments, water metabolism., scenario building and analysis, participatory map making, ethnographic research, land use analysis, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), natural resource assessment and policy relevance assessment) to investigate possible collaborative scenarios. A synthesis of the empirical findings is discussed in the context of the emerging increasingly complex picture of the island’s hydropolitics. Particular emphasis is given on a needs-based approach as an alternative to tool that might help explaining the current situation and mode of negotiation. To illustrate this point, the paper develops four scenarios concerning Cyprus’s future through the lenses of water security. The paper concludes by identifying preconditions for peace-building through water in Cyprus and by suggesting several alternatives to decrease the path dependencies of the two communities and their respective “patron-states”.</p>
<p>Erika Weinthal, Duke University; Neda Zawahri, Cleveland State University; Jeannie Sowers, University of New Hampshire</p>	<p>Securitization of Migration, Water, and Climate Change Linkages The literature on climate and conflict has yielded mixed results about whether climate change causes conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007, Buhaug 2010, Burke et al. 2009, Gleditsch et al. 2007). In trying to tease out linkages between climate and conflict, especially via changes in precipitation and temperature, some authors overstate a direct relationship between climate change and conflict, making exaggerated claims about climate change as a direct contributor to conflict (Dabelko 2009). One particular area in which there has been an increasing tendency to securitize this relationship is climate-induced migration and its effects on scarce freshwater resources. An increase in the number of climate-induced droughts in parts of the Middle East (e.g., in Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq) and recent drought and famine in East Africa (e.g. in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda) has intensified the securitization of discourses around freshwater scarcity, climate-induced migration, and conflict. In Israel, for example, a recent report underscored the threat of illegal climate-induced migration (i.e., climate refugees) from sub-Saharan Africa and its impacts on Israel’s geo-political and economic security. Conversely, leaders, for political reasons, sometimes underestimate the linkages between climate-induced migration and regime stability, as was the case in eastern Syria in the late 2000s in which a prolonged drought affected the food security of over a million people, accelerating migration to urban areas in the provinces. Conflict-induced migration (refugees and internally displaced persons) also stresses highly scarce freshwater resources. In news accounts, policy papers, and international donor reports, conflict-induced migration and scarce freshwater resources increasingly figure in internal and external discourses about the determinants of social stability in the Middle East</p>

	<p>and North Africa. Given popular uprisings and regime repression in Libya, Yemen, and most recently Syria, Jordan has become home to a new wave of conflict-induced migrants. Many news accounts of the Jordanian refugee crisis frame the issue of migration in terms of additional stress on its already scarce water resources. In this paper, we survey the securitization of discourses linking climate change, migration, and water resources, to examine how these framings affects water resource management and political understandings of social stability and conflict. Drawing on selected Middle Eastern cases, we suggest that an overly securitized understanding of climate-induced migration misses the various channels through which climate change is likely to interact with other social, economic, and political variables in exacerbating existing vulnerabilities (e.g., see Raleigh and Urdal 2007, Matthew et al. 2010, White 2011). Moreover, we argue that the securitization of migration and climate changes obscures underlying problems of poor provision of public goods, over dependence on supply-side solutions, and weak governance in many of the Middle East. Securitized framings of climate-induced migration and water resources encourages international donors to focus on policy-responses, such as increased cooperation between interior ministries and expanded regional security cooperation, which do not address the actual linkages between poor water resources management and the need to build adaptive capacity to climatic variability.</p>
Karin Aggestam, Lund University	<p>(De)securitizing water and liberal peacebuilding: Contradictions in terms and practices</p> <p>In recent years, several scholars and practitioners have warned, frequently from neo-Malthusian and realist positions, that conflicts and wars in water stressed areas may increase in the near future. At the same time, the water-war discourse has been subject to growing critique. The overarching aim of this conceptual paper is two-fold: (1) to critically assess the securitization of water and (b) to explore the conflict-cooperation conundrum of water within the dominant liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The argument forwarded is that the interplay between securitization and peacebuilding practices in the water sector generates a number of contradictions both in theory as well as in practice. This Janus-faced approach of framing water on the one hand as "high" politics in various discursive security formations is contrasted to the (re)framing of water cooperation on the other hand as "low" politics within the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Such de-securitization processes tend to favour functional, technical and de-politicised approaches to water cooperation, which often are facilitated and financially supported by the international community. Hence, various roles of international actors including NGOs will be highlighted in the analytical discussion since there are few academic studies that critically have assessed the roles of third parties in water management. Yet, we argue that such functional processes may run the risk of ignoring the powerpolitical and asymmetrical nature of water cooperation that still exists, which thereby may generate counterproductive results, such as strengthening the status quo and the hegemony of stronger parties. To empirically illustrate the conceptual discussion examples will be drawn from the Jordan River Basin.</p>
Joyeeta Gupta, University of Amsterdam	<p>Hard and soft power, high and low politics, and their relationship with water and environmental issues</p> <p>This presentation addresses the question: what is the relationship between hard/soft power and high/low politics especially in the area of environment and water governance. High politics traditionally refers to security issues; issues that are perceived as risking state safety and may call for the suspension of the rule of law and the adoption of non-civilian measures. In contrast, low politics issues do not immediately threaten state survival or call for military action. The distinction between high/low politics is contested. One school of thought would like to broaden the scope of high politics and securitize humanitarian,</p>

	<p>economic or environmental issues. It argues that “environmental challenges ignore national boundaries, calling into question many assumptions of statist definitions of security”, that disruptions of environmental services (clean air and water) could lead to conflict, and that events that (a) threaten the quality of life and (b) narrow the policy options of a state should also be seen as high politics. Security applies not just to the state but can transcend beyond states or go down to the individual. However, I have serious arguments against broadening this concept. First, new security challenges call for cooperation rather than competition. Second, such expansion might justify abandoning the rule of law in favour of non-civilian approaches which may compromise equity issues besides having major socio-economic consequences. Humanitarian issues may be used to justify the military removal of a dictator in another country. Third, expanding the scope of high politics may undermine the state’s ability to face real military threats. Fourth, interstate violence is not similar to environmental degradation; harnessing “the emotive power of nationalism may be counterproductive and undermine a global approach; and environmental degradation is not likely to cause interstate wars”. Furthermore securitizing environmental challenges is analytically confusing, and a bureaucratic tactic to justify non-civilian action. Hence, I argue that water and environmental issues will remain low politics issues even though they are serious.</p>
<p>David. B. Brooks, International Institute for Sustainable Development</p>	<p>Desecuritizing Water: A Proposal for Israel and Palestine</p> <p>Many people immediately think of trans-boundary water in terms of national security, which is not surprising, given the many statements about future wars over water, not oil. However, with some exceptions water is not, nor is it likely to be, a cause of war, not even in the Middle East. Rather, the great bulk of water is used to grow food, which means that water is much an economic commodity than a human right, more a shared commons than a national stock. The greatest need is to ensure that water governance is efficient, equitable and sustainable, with those terms applying to both human uses and ecosystem needs. Further the approach to sharing water must be implementable in practice, a criterion that is often ignored but becomes central when water governance differs across national boundaries, as is the case in Israel and Palestine. This article suggests a joint management structure for Israel and the future State of Palestine that allows for ongoing resolution of issues concerning fresh water, and does so in a way that effectively de-nationalizes and de-securitizes water uses. Two key agencies drive the process: one has a mandate to reach decisions in limited ways and over limited issues, and the other a mandate to investigate, balance, mediate, and recommend decisions. Though designed with the Israeli-Palestinian case in mind, the general approach is applicable to any region where water divides rather than unites states or peoples.</p>
<p>Irna van der Molen University of Twente / Maastricht School of Management</p>	<p>The role of information in water security and securitization</p> <p>The availability of water resources has, historically, been recognized to be of high strategic and ideological importance for Israel. While the strategic nature of water security calls for sustainable planning and management of these resources; such planning is hampered by the securitization of information, and the lack of agreement on the accurateness of data. True, the Oslo II Interim Agreements do include provisions on the exchange of information. In reality such information is, however, only partially shared, in particular when it comes to extraction of water from the aquifers. Furthermore, projections of population growth and population dynamics, a major source of uncertainty for future water management, are sensitive due to their ideological and religious connotations, and used in support of domestic discourses, both within and across Israeli and Palestinian societies. Building upon work by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and De Wilde (1998), I will argue that the role of information in</p>

	<p>the securitization of water is an important constraint in sustainable water resource management by the Israeli and Palestinian Authorities, and discuss several manifestations of securitization in the water discourse. Securitization seems to be beneficial for Israel, and detrimental for the Palestinians. Is the distinction so easy to make? The second question returns to the risks and benefits of securitization of information given uncertainties that emerge with climate change, from population growth and dynamics. Is the potential impact of these developments reason to strengthen the securitization process, or could it be reason to search for new mechanisms in cooperation?</p>
<p>Shafiqul Islam, Tufts University</p>	<p>Water Diplomacy: Striking a balance between risk and opportunity to de-securitize water management for an uncertain future</p> <p>Most difficulties in understanding and managing water security appear to be the product of implicit assumptions and cognitive biases about how water ought to be managed in the face of ever-increasing uncertainty. Specifically, there are three types of uncertainty that need to be addressed: uncertainty of information, uncertainty of action and uncertainty of perception. All three shape water management decisions and related water security issues. Contrary to traditional approaches, Water Diplomacy Framework argues that understanding and management of uncertainty needs to include both risks and opportunities. Using examples from several boundary crossing water cases we will show how this balance between risks and opportunities can be identified and implemented to secure a sustainable water future in the midst of uncertainty.</p>